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THE FLAGLER DOG TRACK CASE*
I.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The gun went off and the dogs shot out of the gate. Leon Rodriguez had bet a trifecta and was hoping that today he would come home
with the jackpot. The dogs were racing around the track. The finish
line was in sight. In an instant the tote board flashed the results. Leon
Rodriguez had won. The total trifecta pool for the race was nearly
$15,000, but there were four other winners at Flagler on August 30,
1977. Unbeknownst to Rodriguez, the track or the state, the other four
people who had won that pool were "electronic partners." Leon Rodriguez did not know that he had really won the whole pool.1 He learned
that much later with the help of people like Martin Dardis. Dardis was
the chief investigator for the Dade County State Attorney's Office in
2
the "Flagler Dog Track Case," as it was commonly known.
A.

THE PLAN

In 1972 Robert Watters had a general conversation with William
(Bill) Deal and Tom Sclerz about ways to beat the betting system with a
computer. 3 Watters did not know that this conversation was the beginning of the great computer fraud at Flagler Dog Track. Two years
later, Deal was asked by co-worker, Jacques Lavigne, whether it was
possible to "pull tickets"4 out of the Flagler computers. A few days
later, Deal told Lavigne the computers could be fixed. But Lavigne was
cautious; if the scheme were to succeed, it could not arouse the suspicion of either the track officials or the betting public. 5 One day as he
was watching a race, Lavigne realized how he could make money without the track's knowledge. In this scheme the track would not lose any
money; "there would be no shortages, no counterfeit tickets lying
around and no evidence that could not be destroyed."' 6 He would "steal
* National Fifth Place, Second Annual Computer Law Writing Competition.
1. Underwood, Win Place ... and Sting, SPORTS ILL., July 23, 1979 at 65.
2. Interview with Martin Dardis, Chief Investigator of the Flagler Dog Track case,
in Miami, Florida (Dec. 19, 1984).
3. Deposition of Robert Watters, in Miami, Florida, at 12, Jan. 26, 1978 [hereinafter
Watters Deposition].
4. Underwood, supra note 1, at 55.
5. Id.

6. Id. at 56.
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it from the betting public, take money right out of the bettors hands
without their knowing it."7 He would steal it from their winnings.
The computer scam was really a very simple procedure. The scam
centered around a race called a trifecta which is "a bet requiring the selection of the exact 1-2-3 order of finish in a race." The odds against
winning are about 336 to 1 in an eight-dog field.9 Using a computer to
calculate the odds is simple, but space constraints make it impossible to
post the 336 possible betting combinations on the infield tote board.
Therefore, when a bettor plays a trifecta, the odds and betting pools are
not displayed until the race is over and the payoff is established.10
What Lavigne realized was that "the trifecta odds could change dramatically, even after a race, and no one would be the wiser.""u The odds
"could be changed in and by the computer itself as they drifted in the
electronic limbo of the computer memory, awaiting the operator's release of the final printout and the posting. 1 2 When Lavigne discussed
his observation with Deal, he was assured
that between the finish and the final posting [Deal] could "move" tickets from one "address" in the computer to another, manipulate the
switches in such a way that tickets purchased on losing dogs could be
readdressed to the number of the winner. The final totals would
match ....
[Hie could do it right under the noses of the men the state
paid to stand watch-because they knew zilch about computers. 13
B.

THE OPERATION

The plan had several phases which required "moving, printing and
then cashing" fraudulent tickets. 14 There were two areas where help
was needed: "the mutuels rooms, whose personnel was employed by
the track,"'15 and "the computer-totalisator operation, run by Automatic
Totalisators."' 16 Lavigne needed someone in the mutuels room to "calm
track officers in case of a foul-up, someone in authority to explain any
delays to the stewards and the two state agents overseeing the operation. 17 Richard Korn, a mutuels calculator, was easily persuaded to
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

16. Id. Autotote, as it is commonly known, is a Delaware corporation which services
sixty tracks nationwide. Autotote "serviced all the Flagler betting machinery and ran the
computers. Deal was Autotote's computer manager at Flagler." Id.

17. Id.
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join Lavigne and Deal. Korn recruited Al Johnston, the mutuels manager. Robert Watters was enlisted to protect Deal in the computer
room. Watters was trained to be Deal's backup. Gilles Caisse was
brought in to keep track of the moving bets and to print the necessary
18
tickets.
Flagler operated two computers, utilizing Autotote's dual system.
Computer A's information was channeled directly into the tote board
and was considered the official system. Computer B operated simultaneously as a backup system. 19 At the start of a race Deal simply
switched off Computer A.
No one noticed when Deal turned off the computer. There were
no telltale lights, no alarms. He waited the minute or so it took the
dogs to run around the track, and on a signal from one of his confederates in the mutuels room-giving the winning number as the dog
crossed the finish line-he transferred bets recorded on losing numbers
to the winners. The transfer involved as many as 20 toggle-switch maneuvers and required upwards of 30 seconds. He then turned the computer back on and hit the "race increment" button to produce the final
printout of the betting. The bogus figures were now implanted with
the legitimate bets.
The rest was routine. When the race judges verified the order of
finish, Deal punched the "compute prices" key, 20then hit the "display"
button to light up the payoffs on the tote board.
What had actually occurred was that the trifecta pool, which should
have been split by all the winners, had been diluted; the number of illegitimate winners proportionally reduced the amount the legitimate winners would receive. 2 ' While Computer A was being tampered with,
Computer B was printing out the real betting results. But because
Computer A produced the official printout, Computer B's output was
22
routinely ignored and thrown away.
All that remained was to print and cash the tickets. Caisse printed
them after the evening program, when Autotote personnel customarily
serviced the ticket-issuing machines behind each cashier's window. His
presence was not unusual. With the ticket machines no longer hooked
up to the computer, it was simple enough to insert a "date stick" (a
plastic key that imprints the date and proper code letters on each
ticket, with the letters changing from race to race to discourage counterfeiters) and manually run off the tickets.
For accuracy and accounting purposes, Caisse kept a record of the
transfers on a small "code sheet," a list of the day's code sequences
18. Id. at 57.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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given to the tellers to code the machines, and totaled the trifecta
23
payoffs on the sheet.
The following day Lavigne cashed the "winning tickets" at the track
24
and distributed the proceeds.
The scam continued until Deal resigned one year later. 25 Watters
worked the scam for one more year, at which time he was promoted to
Southern District Manager of Autotote (in charge of overseeing the operation of all southern race tracks). 26 He remained in Florida and traveled from track to track. 27 The following year Lavigne recruited
Richard Hudson, a Flagler computer manager. Watters showed Hudson
how to manipulate the computer. 28 Hudson became very good at moving tickets; his skill resulted in an increasing number of payoffs. 29 Lavigne, however, could not keep appearing at the "outs window" (the
past performance window), so he began using "ten-percenters." Ten
percenters are "track hangers-on who cash tickets for high rollers and
income-tax evaders. ' 30 These ten-percenters would also sign their own
names to IRS form 5754, a form which must be filed when payoffs are
greater than $600. 3 1 The ten-percenter most frequently used by La32
vigne was Wayne Murray.
Lavigne was the mastermind of the whole scheme. Only Hudson
and Caisse knew that Murray and the other ten-percenters were only
getting five-percent. Hudson and Caisse had only Lavigne's word for
what he paid the others, although they knew how many tickets were
actually printed. Korn and Johnston, in the mutuels room, had only
Lavigne's word on the number of tickets printed. Watters' travels pre33
vented him from being fully informed.
Lavigne had warned all the conspirators about looking too flashy,
looking as if they had extra money.34 Hudson started doing a few
things out of the ordinary, even after being warned. "One night Hudson
came out of Flagler with $10,000 in his pocket. ' 35 "He opened a safedeposit box at a bank in Hollywood, Fla. and put the bulk of his money
there. He stowed additional money in a plastic bag and buried it under
23. Id. at 57-58.
24.

Id. at 58.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Watters Deposition, supra note 3, at 9.
Underwood, supra note 1, at 58.
Id.

29.

Id. at 60.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 60.
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the patio where he sometimes fed his dog." 36 Hudson's wife, Doris, did
not know where the extra money was coming from, but she liked having it and began spending it. "When [Hudson] could no longer explain
3
away his incredible good fortune" to Doris, he confided in her.

7

She

became the first person outside of the Flagler conspiracy to learn about
a wide circle of
the scam. Unfortunately for the men, "Doris had
38
friends and was not a reluctant conversationalist.
C.

THE INVESTIGATION

On September 2, 1977 a call came to the Dade County State Attor39
ney's Office.
[An] informer had contacted David Hecht, owner and general manager
of Flagler, a week before, telling him somebody was "messing around
with the outs book," cashing what must be fraudulent tickets at the
past-performance window. The informer said they were "using the
computer." He said he knew because he had a "close friendship" 40with
the wife of one of the computer operators, a man named Hudson.

Hecht investigated, but found that counterfeit tickets could not be
the problem since the track figures balanced and there were no deficits.
Faced with no answer, the IRS, 41 the Florida Division of Pari-Mutuel
Wagering, 42 and the FB143 were contacted for assistance.

The IRS stated, "It would take two years to run this down." 4 4 Dan
Bradley, the director of the Florida Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering,
said that his agency "doesn't have an investigative staff he can call on
for such matters. '45 Julius Mattson, head of the Miami FBI office, said
that the FBI had no jurisdiction since "there was no probable cause to
believe that a federal crime had been committed. ' 46 As a result, responsibility for the case fell on the Dade County State Attorney's office,
and Martin Dardis was assigned to the case.
Keith Dodwell, executive vice-president of Autotote, was flown in
to help with the investigation. He and Dardis looked at the printouts
from both Computer A and Computer B and noticed some discrepancies. There were discrepancies in the amount of the winning payoff
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 62.
42. LaBrecque, Why Flagler Dog Track Was Easy Pickings, MIAMI HER., Sept. 21,
1977, at 1, col. 3.
43. Underwood, supra note 1, at 62.
44. Id.
45. LaBrecque, supra note 42, at 17A, col. 2.
46. Id.
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from a race as well as the number of tickets for the same race. 47
Computer "A," said Dodwell, dispensed three copies, one for the
mutuels room to check against the cash brought in after each race, one
for the state to verify tax revenue, the track's take, breakage, etc. and
one as a permanent record. Computer "B," he said, was a backup,
used
48
only in emergencies. The "B" copy was generally thrown away.
Dodwell realized that it must be the trifecta winnings that were being tampered with and "if the figures were altered in the computer,
that had to be done by the operator, a man named Richard Hudson. Or
' ' 49
his assistant, a man named Gilles Caisse.
Both men began rummaging through the litter from the wastebaskets at the track. Dardis pieced together a paper which proved to be an
official "code sheet." The code sheet contained columns of handwritten
numbers. Dodwell compared the trifecta payoffs with the code sheet
and found that they matched. The code sheet user had "won" over
$16,000.50

Dardis stayed all weekend. He examined some 5754 forms signed
by Wayne Murray, a man who had cashed trifecta tickets worth
$150,000.51 He sifted through boxes of computer printouts, cashed tickets, and 5754 forms.
In the columns of ciphers on the computer printout for the seventh
race of the Flagler matinee of Aug. 30, he found that Machine No. 507,
located in a trifecta ticket window in the grandstand, had sold no
trifecta wheel tickets: the entry said "0." But when Dardis matched
that figure against his collection of 5754 forms, he saw that Murray had
cashed four trifecta tickets worth $12,000 on that race-and each ticket
wheel bore the signet of Machine No. 507.52
Comparing these tickets with the machine test tickets kept on file,
Dardis discovered that while the date and code numbers had been
printed on the same machine, they had been printed at different times.
For Dardis, this proved two things: 1) Someone had come back to
Machine 507 after the computers had been turned off, reinserted a code
stick and manually printed the four tickets Murray had cashed; 2) The
thief did not think to look on the printout to see whether any legitimate tickets were sold at Machine 507 for
that race. This meant that
53
Wayne Murray's tickets were fraudulent.
Monday morning, Labor Day, Dardis called the Dade County State At47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Underwood, supra note 1, at 62.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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torney and told them how the scam was being run.54
Dardis had Wayne Murray picked up for questioning. Murray confirmed Dardis' suspicions that the tickets were fraudulent.5 5 Dardis
then investigated the fifteen people who had access to the mutuels and
computers rooms at Flagler. He knew it would be difficult if not impossible to connect all the conspirators to the crime. The end of the dog
racing season was approaching and the track would be closing down.s 6
Dardis decided to "turn" a conspirator, one whose guilt he could
prove--grant him immunity in order to implicate the others. He had
divided the suspects into two general groups. The mutuels personnel
were mostly itinerants who traveled from track to track like carnival
people; Dardis thought of them, generically, as "angle shooters." The
computer people, on the other hand, he found "more introspective" and
to turn one of
"less likely to bluff or run for a lawyer." He decided
57
these. He decided to turn Richard (Rick) Hudson.
Dardis planned to approach Hudson, using the original informant, Irv
Solotoff, who was a friend of Doris Hudson. Solotoff, under Dardis' instructions, wore a transmitter and went to see his friend Doris Hudson.58 She and Solotoff talked about the State Attorney's investigation,
her $6000 Hummel collection and the money buried in her backyard.
She asked Solotoff to take her figurine collection and $15,000 in cash,
59
and hide them.
Dardis subpoenaed Doris Hudson. He offered to give her husband,
Rick, immunity in exchange for his assistance in rounding60up the other
conspirators and his return of the illegal gambling profits.
Doris and Dardis went to the house in Hollywood to get the
money. 61 When Rick came home, Dardis, who was outside his jurisdiction, told Rick he knew how the scheme worked. Rick decided to coop62
erate and agreed to take a polygraph test.

Hudson told Dardis that Lavigne was the leader. He also told
Dardis of Watters' involvement, a connection which Dardis had not suspected. Hudson then agreed to wear a wire transmitter for a week. At
that time Dardis was convinced he knew all of the involved conspirators. Within three weeks of the initial call to the State Attorney's office, all the conspirators, except Johnston, had been arrested.63 The
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 65.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 66.
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State Attorney said "It's the most clever criminal scheme I have ever
64
seen."
Caisse and Watters, the Autotote employees, turned state's evidence and "agreed to plead out."' 65 Korn, Johnston and Lavigne, the

track employees, hired lawyers, 66 although Korn and Johnston later
plead out as well.
William Deal, the original computer skinner, who had resigned and
was rehired by Autotote in 1977 as its northern district manager, was
not arrested. The 67statute of limitations had run out. This time, however, he was fired.

As for the recovered money, claims flooded Dardis' office. The
money was placed in an interest-bearing account while the claims were
68
processed.
II.

CRIMINAL CASES

Warrants for the arrests of Samuel Korn, Albert Sidney Johnston
and Jacques Lavigne were sworn out on September 19, 1977. They were
arrested and charged with one count of conspiracy, sixty-three counts of
grand larceny, and sixty-three counts of receiving stolen property. All
three plead guilty to all of the counts. Both Johnston and Korn agreed
to make full restitution. 69 Lavigne, however, refused to cooperate. 70
Johnston was sentenced to one year for each count, to be served
concurrently, and two years probation. Korn was sentenced to eighteen
months for each count, to be served concurrently, and one-half year
probation. Jacques Lavigne was sentenced to two and one-half years
71
concurrent time and two and one-half years of probation.
III.

CIVIL CASES

There were three civil cases arising out of the Flagler Dog Track
case. These cases were consolidated on appeal as State of Floridav. UMler, Kneale and WeiSS.

72

The case was originally heard upon a joint pe-

tition to distribute the funds held by the State Attorney's office. 73 The
fund was the money Dardis had put in the interest bearing account.
The causes of action were: to defraud, to conspire, to cheat and to
64.
65.

Malone, Dog Players Bilked Via Computer,MIAMI HER., Sept. 20, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
Underwood, supra note 1, at 66.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Johnston, No. 77-79622 (Fla. Cir. Ct. April 7, 1978).
Underwood, supra note 1 at 66.
State v. Johnston, No. 77-79622 (Fla. Cir. Ct. April 7, 1978).
State v. LJller, No. 84-732, slip op. (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1984).
Id.
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deceive the plaintiffs out of correct winnings on trifecta tickets by ille74
gally rigging and manipulating the computers at Flagler Dog Track.
The original defendants were Automatic Totalisators (USA), LTD.,
West Flagler Associates, LTD., and the State of Florida. The state was
ultimately dropped as a defendant. Defendants St. Paul Fire and
Marine Insurance Co., Autotote's insurance company, and Old Republic
Insurance Co., West Flagler's insurance company, were added.75
The major argument of the case, however, centered around the recovered money. Distribution of all but $19,673.02 of the $214,362.40
available in Dardis' fund was made to the 242 persons who claimed their
winnings. The $19,673.02 is what Uller, Kneale and Weiss were claiming as theirs.

76

On appeal the lower court's decision was affirmed. 77 The state argument that the money was part of an unclaimed or abandoned parimutuel pool, and therefore was either abandoned property under section 717.0978 of the Florida Statutes which would belong to the state, or
was unclaimed moneys used as evidence in a criminal case under section
116.2179 or 116.2380 of the Florida Statutes which would belong to Dade
County,8 1 lost.

IV.

COMPUTER CRIMES STATUTE

82
In 1978 Florida passed the country's first Computer Crimes Act.
If the Flagler criminals could have been charged under this act, they
could have been charged and sentenced as second degree felons, a crime
punishable by a maximum of fifteen years imprisonment and a fine of
$10,000 for each infraction. They could have been sentenced to five
years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $5000 for each infraction as
third degree felons. They could also have been charged and convicted
as first and second degree misdemeanants. All these computer crime
sanctions could have been imposed without precluding "the applicability

74. Id.
75. Id. Old Republic denied the allegations and said their contract with West Flagler
did not permit West Flagler to be indemnified by Old Republic. There was also a contractual dispute between Autotote and West Flagler. West Flagler said their lease contract
with Autotote provided that Autotote was to hold West Flagler harmless and to indemnify it. Id.
76. Id. It was established that the money had not been received in 1974, 1975 or 1976.
This fact should have eliminated Weiss and Kneal's claim for those years. Uller argued
he had won numerous trifecta tickets between July 1, 1977 and August 30, 1977. Id.
77. Id.
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 717.09 (West 1969).
79. Id. § 116.21 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986);
80. Id. § 116.23 (West 1982).
81. State v. Uller, No. 84-732, slip op. (Fla.3d Dist.Ct.App. Dec. 4, 1984).
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.01-815.07 (West Supp. 1986).
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of any other provision of the criminal laws of [Florida] .... ,,s3
V.

DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING UPDATE

Florida race tracks are governed by the Division of Pari-Mutuel
Wagering, a Florida agency run by the Board of Business Regulation. It
is "responsible for knowing whether Florida's tracks and frontons are
run properly ....
But according to Dan Bradley, the director of the
agency at the time of the Flagler case, "Florida is ill-equipped to verify
the honesty of the figures supplied by the state's 37 horse and dog
tracks and jai-alai frontons and unable to certify the honesty of the
races themselves. '8 5 In 1977 the department had no full-time auditors
or computer experts. Flagler's "part-time state auditor using a $49.95
calculator was no match for a manipulated multimillion-dollar computer system spewing out fraudulent pari-mutuel tickets worth
'8 6
thousands.
There have been continual efforts to step up security at the
frontons and tracks. Robert M. Rosenberg, the present director of the
Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, stated that there has been a lot of
effort to regulate the totalisator industry, largely as a result of the
Flagler Dog Track case.8 7 He said,
Price Waterhouse was commissioned by the State to create rules which
would avoid recurrence of that type of thing. Rules were drafted, filed
but not promulgated. The majority of the extensive package of rules,
about two-thirds, will place certain obligations on the track to implement certain controls, safeguards and procedures. The other one-third
88
obligates the tote companies to build safeguards into their systems.
",84

Florida enacted a totalisator licensing statute in 1978 which allows
the state to license totalisator operators and to set a standard for licensure; an amendment to this bill makes totalisator companies strictly liable for losses on state revenues for their acts.8 9 Other actions taken
after the Flagler Dog Track case include the addition of three compliance auditors. 90 These auditors serve two functions. They perform
ticket audits and they test totalisator systems before the systems are al83. Id. § 815.07.
84. LaBrecque supra note 42, at 1, col. 3.
85. Id. at 1, col. 4-5.
86. Id. at 1, col. 3.

87. Telephone interview with Robert M. Rosenberg, Director of the Florida Division
of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (January 3, 1985).
88. Id.
89. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 550.48 (West Supp. 1986).
90. Telephone interview with Michael Gouge, Assistant Director of Florida Division
of Pari-mutuel Wagering (January 2, 1985); telephone interview with Rosenberg, supra
note 87.
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lowed to be set up at tracks. 91 Tests are routinely run on every tote system in the state. Imaginary wagers and imaginary pools are created to
check the results and the accuracy of the totalisator equipment. 92 The
agency has tried to look at the computer programs owned by the tote
companies in order to review the accuracy of these programs but the
tote companies have claimed proprietary rights, arguing the computer
93
code is confidential.
Recently, Florida, in an unprecedented case, refused to relicense a
major totalisator company, Western Totalisator, which had contracts at
the Pensacola and Seminole tracks, and Palm Beach Jai-Alai, on the basis of Florida Statute § 550.48. 94 Additionally, the new regulations have
led to a number of criminal prosecutions under the Florida Computer
Crimes Act. Three people in Pensacola, Florida, were charged with
grand theft, computer fraud and conspiracy. They plead guilty to the
95
counts of grand theft and computer fraud.
Marilyn Hochman

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Telephone interview with Gouge, supra note 90.
Id.
Telephone interview with Rosenberg, supra note 87.
Id.
Id.

